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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – APPEALS  
 
Summary 
 
 This case was an appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a jury verdict 
of one count of burglary, one count of obtaining and using personal identification information of 
another, one count of fraudulent use of a credit or debit card, and eight counts of possession of a 
credit card without the cardholder’s consent. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for further 
proceedings and granted appellant’s motion for leave to file a reply to the State’s response.  The 
court agreed with appellant that the appeal on his written judgment of conviction is moot due to 
the district court’s granting a motion for a new trial. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
           On March 2, 2004, the district court entered the written judgment of conviction against 
appellant Noel Vest (“Vest”).  Vest filed notice of appeal on March 29, 2004. 
            On May 5, 2004, Vest filed a motion for a new trial in the district court based on newly 
discovered evidence.  The district court entered a written order granting the motion on July 27, 
2004.  The State did not appeal from the district court's order. 
            On September 7, 2004, Vest filed a motion requesting the Nevada Supreme Court to 
remand his appeal.  In the motion, Vest argued that the appeal was now moot in light of the 
district court's order.  The State filed an opposition to Vest's motion on the same day.   
On September 10, 2004, Vest filed a motion for leave to file a reply to the State's 
response.   
             
Discussion 
 
The State claimed that the appeal should not be remanded and that the district court's 
order should be deemed a nullity.  Relying on Layton v. State 2, the State argued that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial after the notice of appeal had been 
filed.3   
           At the time Layton was decided, NRS 176.515(3) provided:  “A motion for a new trial 
based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years 
after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand 
of the case.” (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
1 By Amanda Yen 
2 89 Nev. 252, 510 P.2d 864 (1973). 
3 In Layton, the Nevada Supreme Court held that “[t]he district court has no authority to grant a new trial once the 
notice of appeal has been filed.” Id. at 254, 510 P.2d at 865. 
            However, in 1983, NRS 176.515(3) was amended and the emphasized language was 
removed.4  The statute now provides that “[a] motion for a new trial based on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence may be made only within 2 years after the verdict or finding of 
guilt.”5  Based on the plain language of the statute as it presently reads, the court concluded that 
it was no longer necessary to remand an appeal in order for the district court to grant a post-
judgment motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.6  
           
Conclusion 
 
 Based on NRS 176.515(3), the court determined that Vest’s motion for a new trial based 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence was proper and that the district court’s order 
granting the motion in thE case was a final independently appealable order and therefore, the 
appeal on convicted judgment was moot.  
 
                                                 
4 1983 NEV. STAT., ch. 571 § 2, at 1671. 
5 Id.  
6 The court further noted that pursuant to NRAP 4(b)(1): “[a] motion for a new trial based on . . . newly discovered 
evidence will . . . extend the time for appeal from a judgment of conviction if the motion is made before or within 
thirty (30) days after entry of judgment.” In the instant case, the motion did not extend the appeal period because it 
was not filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction. 
 
